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Introduction 
Concerns about expected negative consequences of future population ageing in 
Europe are reaching larger and wider segments of society. In addition to those 
scientists who have been pointing out the issue for more than 30 years, media 
commentators and politicians started to pick it up a decade ago, mostly with 
respect to the looming pension crisis when the baby boomers retire. Now even the 
business community—which typically has a shorter planning horizon—is 
becoming increasingly interested in the issue. For example, at the recent Munich 
Economic Summit, chief executives of BMW, Siemens and other major multi-
national corporations not only debated about what population ageing means to the 
future structures of their customers and employees, but also about its implications 
for European economic competitiveness. Discussions at such events usually 
ramble from the need for life-long learning to more flexible employment 
strategies to all kinds of proposals for how birth rates could be pushed up again. 
While many of the industrial leaders appreciate the rapid increase of a wealthy 
and healthy elderly population as a great business opportunity for themselves, 
they also see it as a major challenge for Europe’s standing in the world. 
In this rather confusing state of public debate about demographic change, the 
recent communication of the European Commission (2006) is a welcome attempt 
at a more systematic, European-level consideration of the different aspects 
involved in Europe’s demographic future. It is largely successful in covering the 
state of the art in a broad array of relevant topics, but in a few key areas the 
document confuses rather than clarifies the discussion. In particular, the 
Communication tends to mix policies and strategies aimed at adapting our 
institutions to an (externally given) demographic change with those trying to 
influence (mitigate) the demographic trends. In the following section I will draw a 
comparison to the ongoing, parallel discussion about climate change policies and 
show how demographers can learn from the climate change debate in terms of 
analytical clarity for discussing this long-term challenge. 
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The second part of this short comment will address the dominating mitigation 
policy propagated by the Communication, namely that governments have the 
responsibility to help couples fill the supposedly big gap between desired and 
actual family size. I will address some serious problems with this politically very 
convenient and almost universally acclaimed policy paradigm. 
 
What we can learn from the climate change policy discussion? 
Policy makers in Europe are currently struggling with two major, long term 
challenges, both of which have the potential to significantly influence the lives 
and wellbeing of future generations (already including today’s younger age 
group) and for which they still lack more specific knowledge about what exactly 
the implications are likely to be because both are unprecedented in recorded 
human history. 
These two major challenges, which have a surprising number of 
commonalities, are climate change and population ageing. Both are unintended 
consequences of otherwise positive and highly welcome trends. In the case of 
climate change, higher standards of living and greater personal mobility have 
brought about several most desirable increases in the quality of life and personal 
freedom, but they also require a lot more energy, which given today’s 
technologies results in greenhouse gas emissions that in accumulation alter our 
climate. We do not yet see any significant systematic changes in temperatures 
(although we increasingly interpret every series of hot days or storms in this 
sense), but we trust scientists who tell us this will be happening over the coming 
decades. The same is true for population ageing, which is the consequence of 
highly welcomed increases in life expectancy and the equally appreciated choice 
that potential parents have through modern contraception to decide how many 
children they want. In sum these two achievements of human development result 
in a process that leads to more elderly people living longer lives, and to fewer 
children. Since the strong cohorts of the baby boom are still of working age today, 
we do not yet see much of the predicted worsening in the ratio of contributors to 
beneficiaries in the pension system, but we have good and convincing reasons to 
expect a doubling of the old-age dependency ratio over the coming decades. 
How dangerous are the consequences of climate change and how dangerous 
are those of population ageing to future wellbeing? In both cases science has 
developed fairly good analytical handles as to what will happen to the processes 
themselves. Global circulation models (GCMs) have made a lot of progress in 
terms of drawing up likely future maps of temperatures and precipitation under 
different emissions scenarios. But it is hard to anticipate the way in which human 
populations will be able to adapt to these long term changes. Many of the horror 
stories about the consequences of climate change result from an illegitimate 
match of the likely climate of 2080 with the infrastructure and technology of 
today. Take malaria as an example, where many of the numbers circulated result 
from a combination of future climate conditions with today’s public health 
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systems. It does not take much in terms of public health measures to get rid of 
malaria as can be seen from past successes in Europe, North America and parts of 
Asia. Social, economic and institutional development over the coming decades 
will hopefully enable more countries to have similar success. This is comparable 
to shocking projections that result from matching, e.g., the projected age 
distribution of 2050 to the age pattern of disability observed today, which results 
in a huge increase of the disabled population in need of long-term care. If one 
considers the likely trend that disability-free life expectancy increases roughly in 
parallel with total life expectancy, then the future looks much less dramatic. 
This is not the place to enter into a deeper substantive discussion about the 
dangers associated with both of these secular changes. Rather I want to point out 
the very important and useful distinction between mitigation and adaptation 
policies that has become the basis for all climate change discussions. 
Interestingly, and in sharp contrast to the population ageing discussion, climate 
change policies so far have focused almost exclusively on mitigation strategies: 
What can be done to lower the amount of greenhouse gases (GHG) that enter the 
atmosphere every year, or—more realistically at the global level—how can the 
rate of increase in GHG emission be slowed? Like population dynamics, climate 
change has a huge momentum: Alternative emissions scenarios over the coming 
two decades will only marginally influence the climate by 2080. Irrespective of 
what we do in the near future, the climate will get warmer, so change is already 
pre-programmed in the system, as it is for population ageing. But since in the very 
long run atmospheric GHG concentrations will largely depend on the emissions 
trajectory that we will choose during the coming decades, it is so important that 
mitigation policies are put in place now. Over the coming years, policy attention 
will then undoubtedly also move to adaptation policies aimed at reducing the 
possible negative impact of unavoidable (given) climate change. 
While it has been politically correct for climate policies to focus mostly on 
mitigation strategies and best not to mention adaptation strategies (because they 
could be seen as excuses to do less about mitigation), exactly the opposite is the 
case with respect to population ageing. Most politically correct discussions 
(including the Communication) focus on a wide spectrum of adaptation policies 
which essentially view demographic change as a given. As important as these 
policies are, demography (at least in the longer term) is not destiny. The two 
mitigation factors that (at least theoretically) can be influenced by policies are 
migration and fertility. While migration can always be used as a short-term option 
as long as enough potential migrants are waiting on the door step (and hence 
comes close to an adaptation strategy), fertility in its long-term dynamics is in fact 
similar to GHG emissions: increases in fertility will only influence the size of the 
labour force with a lag of several decades. These dynamics would hence justify an 
urgent and explicit focus on fertility. 
But somehow mitigation strategies to population ageing in Europe are 
currently (still) considered terribly politically incorrect. This is also reflected in 
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the Communication’s key paragraph dealing with fertility. Evidently, the authors 
were afraid to even mention the words “fertility” or “birth rate” in the title of this 
paragraph and rather chose the—presumably euphemistic but in fact rather 
awkward—wording “Promoting demographic renewal in Europe”. Unfortunately, 
in population analysis the term “demographic renewal” refers to the process by 
which older members of the population die and are being replaced by younger 
ones, but I assume the statement does not want to suggest enhancing the first 
element of this process. Leaving the specific terminology aside, in this paragraph 
as well as in many others of the document, the dimensions of mitigation and 
adaptation are not separated well enough but indeed still intertwined with yet 
another important though separate issue, namely the question of how dangerous 
the consequences of population ageing are. These are three important issues that 
all need more research, but first of all more we need more analytical clarity in 
dealing with them. 
 
Is the gap between ideal and actual family size a valid policy rationale? 
The paragraph on policies affecting fertility mentioned above subscribes entirely 
to one rationale for why governments should become active in this field. The key 
sentence on “Reactions to the falling birth rates” goes as follows: “These 
reactions are both necessary and realistic: necessary because surveys show that in 
all EU countries couples would like to have more children; realistic because 
international comparisons underline the effectiveness of family and other 
policies…” 
 
This short text contains three important assertions: 
1) That there is indeed a significant gap in low-fertility countries of Europe 
between the numbers of children that people of childbearing age consider as ideal 
(“would like to have”) and the number of children they actually have; 
2) That governments can do something that will be effective (“it is 
realistic”) in closing this gap; and 
3) That governments in fact have an obligation (“it is necessary”) to try to 
close this gap. 
 
Let me first address the third issue because it is the easiest. In a discussion, 
Paul Demeny once made the following point on the government’s supposed 
obligation to help in filling gaps: it is plausible to assume that most people desire 
to have more days of vacation on a Caribbean beach than they actually have. Does 
this necessarily imply that the government has to jump in to fill the gap? Of 
course not. Put in more economic terms, governments should try to help close 
individual gaps between desire and reality only if there is a positive externality for 
society from having this gap closed. However, this important and all-decisive 
point for the reasoning is not given in the White Paper. Is it indeed important for 
European societies to have more births? This is a highly complex and difficult 
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question which requires much more research for a science-based answer, 
considering all relevant dimensions from national identity to intergenerational 
relations and from gender interests to environmental concerns. And only if the 
answer is that viewing all things together there is indeed a significant positive 
externality, can this constitute a need for governments to help close the gap—or 
possibly even to go beyond that, if it turns out that there is no gap left to be filled. 
The next fallacy in this very popular and evidently politically convenient 
reasoning is that as proof for the existence of a major gap, the proponents usually 
compare the cohort measure of ideal family size (often even including people 
beyond reproductive age) with the tempo-distorted period measure of the Total 
Fertility Rate (TFR). As Table 1 shows, this inconsistency is not a minor technical 
issue but rather casts some doubts on the whole reasoning. 
 
Table 1:  
Different family size measures for selected EU countries and different ways to 
calculate the “gap” between ideal and actual family size 
 (1) 
Personal 
ideal 
family size 
(2) 
Actual + 
intended 
family size
(3) 
TFR 
2004 
(4) 
Tempo 
adjusted 
TFR 
(5) 
Gap 1 
(1)-(3) 
(6) 
Gap 2 
(1)–(4) 
(7) 
Gap 3 
(1)-(2) 
Finland 2.61 2.62 1.80 1.88 .81 .73 -.01 
France 2.48 2.36 1.91 2.02 .57 .46 .12 
UK 2.43 2.38 1.63 1.85 .80 .58 .05 
Portugal 2.23 2.06 1.40 1.80 .83 .43 .17 
Czech Republic 2.04 1.98 1.22 1.67 .82 .37 .06 
Italy 2.02 1.76 1.33 1.41 .69 .61 .26 
Romania 1.81 1.71 1.29 1.58 .52 .23 .10 
Austria 1.69 1.54 1.42 1.63 .27 .06 .15 
Notes: Columns  (1) and (2) are based on the Eurobarometer 2006 data for women aged 25-39. 
Sources: VID-IIASA (2006) and computations of Testa (2006) based on Eurobarometer 2006 data. 
 
Table 1 lists four different fertility indicators for eight selected EU member 
countries. The first column lists the personal ideal family size as collected in the 
Eurobarometer 2006 for women aged 25-39 (Testa 2006). The second column 
gives another family size measure from the same Eurobarometer for the same 
group of women which simply adds the number of children already born per 
woman to those she says she still intends to have. This second measure is much 
closer to the real childbearing behaviour of women since it includes the actual 
birth experience plus intended pregnancies, which are more realistic predictors 
than ideal family size. A comparison between these two family size measures 
from the same survey, one measuring the personal ideal and the other the reality 
(plus intentions), shows that there is almost no gap to be filled (see Gap 3 in 
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column 7. Only in the very low-fertility countries Italy and Portugal is the gap 
more than 0.15. 
The third and fourth columns in Table 1 list the TFR for 2004 and the tempo-
adjusted TFR as published in the European Demographic Data Sheet (VID-IIASA 
2006), calculated using the Bongaarts-Feeney method. The difference between the 
raw TFR and the ideal family size (Gap 1 in column 5) is indeed very significant, 
above half a child in seven of the eight countries and even 0.8 children or more in 
half of them. But as mentioned above these two figures are not comparable 
because they measure very different things, one cohort ideals and the other 
tempo-distorted period fertility. If one wishes to compare the ideal family size 
from the Eurobarometer to a period fertility measure, then tempo-adjusted TFR 
should be used. And as column 6 shows, here the gap (Gap 2) is much smaller, 
with Austria having the lowest gap. It is also important to notice that in most 
countries where the TFR is very low, such as Romania, Austria and the Czech 
Republic, the gap is particularly small. Does this constitute less reason for 
governments to take action in these countries? On the other hand, high-fertility 
countries such as Finland, France and the UK have some of the biggest gaps 
measured this way. Should governments be particularly active in those countries? 
Actually however, Finland, which has by far the greatest Gap 2 with 0.73 children 
according to this measure, is often used as an example of what kind of policies 
governments in low-fertility countries should introduce in order to make it easier 
to combine work and family. 
The data presented in Table 1 cast serious doubts on the validity of the gap 
rationale for fertility policies. At the high end, despite the highest measured gap, 
there is probably little need for new strong government action in Finland because 
that country has a satisfactory fertility level for what is needed for longer term 
demographic stability. At the other extreme, the Austrian government is unhappy 
with its low fertility rate, but not because there is such a big gap (it is only 0.06) 
but because the overall level is so low. If there is a problem in Austria, then it is 
that ideal family size recently declined. Like other German-speaking countries, 
Austria has seen a recent fall of ideal family size and already one-third of young 
Austrian males now consider not having any children as ideal. This trend is the 
basis for the Low Fertility Trap Hypothesis (Lutz et al. 2006) which assumes that 
ideal family size declines for the generation that is already socialized in a low-
fertility environment. If this is indeed the case, then ideal family size will soon 
start declining in the Mediterranean and central/eastern European countries. Then 
unhappy governments will have to address the desire for children directly, rather 
than pointing at the politically convenient self-deception of only wanting to help 
couples to meet their desires. 
And what about the second assertion that government policies can indeed 
make a difference, if they are crafted in the right way? This is a hard question to 
answer, although it is not as difficult as the first one about the socially desirable 
level of fertility. Although it has been around for decades, no satisfactory answer 
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has been found. This is one of the reasons why the 2007 conference of the Vienna 
Institute of Demography (held in Vienna, December 6-7, 2007) is exclusively 
dedicated to the question: “Can policies enhance fertility in Europe?” While the 
Communication seems quite certain on this question (“it is realistic”), many 
scholars in population have serious doubts about it. Since the empirical basis for 
such analysis is still very limited—few countries aside from France have actually 
pursued strong and explicit pro-natalist policies for longer periods—at a 
minimum we need to make sure that current political efforts in influencing the 
birth rate in Europe and parts of East Asia are well monitored using the most 
powerful analytical tools available. Collecting parity-specific information on 
births (possibly on a monthly basis as is regularly done for unemployment rates), 
which can also be adjusted for various distortions including the tempo effect 
(Sobotka et al. 2005), would be a rather easy way to improve the empirical basis 
for addressing this difficult question. But some governments—most prominently 
Germany—who say that they are very concerned about fertility do not even 
collect birth order specific information on fertility. Here would be an obvious 
place to start, and even a very cheap one at that. 
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